Tag Archives: Middle East

There Is No Palestinian State

by Efraim Karsh

As the United Nations prepares to vote next week on the issue of Palestinian statehood, it might be worth bearing in mind that whatever the outcome, the result will certainly not be the creation of an actual Palestinian state, any more than the November 1947 partition resolution spelled the inevitable creation of a Jewish one.

In 1948, Israel came into being due to the extraordinary cohesion of Palestine’s Jewish community (the Yishuv). Armed with an unwavering sense of purpose and an extensive network of institutions, the Yishuv managed to surmount a bevy of international obstacles and fend off a pan-Arab attempt to destroy it. Likewise, it was the total lack of communal solidarity—the willingness to subordinate personal interest to the collective good—that accounted for the collapse and dispersion of Palestinian Arab society as its leaders tried to subvert partition.
Sixty-four years later, Palestinian society seems no better prepared for statehood. And the U.N. would be doing the Palestinians a great disservice by accepting the corrupt and dysfunctional Palestinian Authority as its newest member. While this would hardly be the first failed state to be delivered by the world organization, the unique circumstances of its possible birth make failure a foregone conclusion, and the consequences are too dire to contemplate.

The building of the Jewish state began in the Swiss town of Basel in 1889 at the First Zionist Congress, which defined Zionism’s goal as “the creation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by public law,” and established institutions to promote it. By the time the League of Nations appointed Britain as the mandatory for Palestine 23 years later, the Yishuv had been transformed into a cohesive and organized national community that provided most of Palestine’s Jewry with work, trade union protection as well as with education, health care, and defense.

By contrast, it was the tragedy of the Palestinians that the two leaders who determined their national development during the 20th century—Hajj Amin Husseini and Yasser Arafat—were far more interested in destroying the Jewish national cause than leading their own people. As far back as 1978, Arafat told his close friend and collaborator, Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, that the Palestinians lacked the traditions, unity, and discipline to have a successful state. Once given control of parts of the West Bank and Gaza, this prognosis became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as his regime quickly became oppressive and corrupt. Later it helped launch the second intifada, the bloodiest and most destructive confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians since the 1948 war. In the process, he destroyed the fragile civil society and relatively productive economy that had developed during the previous decade.

Paradoxically, it was Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the June 1967 war that laid the groundwork for Palestinian civil society. Not only did it bring the issue of Palestinian independence to the forefront of the international agenda, but it also produced dramatic improvements in the Palestinians’ quality of life. During the occupation, the territories became the fourth fastest-growing economy in the world—ahead of Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and substantially ahead of Israel itself. From 1967 to 2000, life expectancy rose from 48 to 72, while infant mortality fell from 60 per 1,000 live births in 1968 to 15 per 1,000 births in 2000. And while there was not a single university that existed in the West Bank or Gaza before Israeli rule, by the mid-1990s, there were seven such institutions, boasting more than 16,000 students.

All of these achievements were steadily undone after Oslo, as Arafat’s regime took control over parts of the territories. In September of 1993, conditions in the West Bank and Gaza were still better than those in most neighboring Arab states—and this despite the economic decline caused by the first intifada. Within six months of Arafat’s arrival in Gaza, the standard of living in the strip fell by 25 percent, and more than half of the area’s residents claimed to have been happier under Israeli rule. The launch of the second intifada six years later dealt the death blow to the economic and institutional gains that Israel bequeathed.

In an apparent departure from this destructive path, in the summer of 2007, PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad embarked on the first true state-building effort in Palestinian history. And he has had some modest successes, most notably a sustained economic recovery that has nearly restored the West Bank’s pre-intifada levels of performance. Yet Fayyad has created no new institutions, and the PA remains a corrupt and wholly dysfunctional organization. The Palestinian prime minister may claim to have laid the groundwork for a democratic Palestine, but the presidency of Mahmoud Abbas, and by extension his own position, are totally unconstitutional. Not only did Abbas defy Hamas’s landslide victory in the January 2006 parliamentary election, but Abbas’s presidency expired more than two years ago.

No less important, the two factions dominating Palestinian life, the Hamas and Fatah, remain armed groups, and active practitioners of terrorism—an assured recipe for a failed state. The Oslo Accords charged the PA to dismantle all armed groups in the West Bank and Gaza, but Arafat never complied; David Ben-Gurion, by contrast, dissolved all Jewish underground movements within a fortnight from Israel’s independence, incorporating them into the newly established Israeli Defense Forces. Following statehood, even if Abbas were to make a genuine commitment to reform, Hamas would continue to defy his tenuous authority; not only does the group rule the Gaza Strip, which it has transformed into an Islamist micro-state, but it also wields considerable power in the West Bank.

Small wonder that recent surveys show that more Palestinians in east Jerusalem, who are entitled to Israeli social benefits and are free to travel across Israel’s pre-1967 borders, would rather become citizens of the Jewish state than citizens of a new Palestinian one. Two thirds of them believe that a unilateral declaration of Palestinian independence backed by the U.N. would have no positive effect. And they’re right. Unfortunately the ramifications—increased conflict with Israel and a deepening rift in an already divided Palestinian society—are manifold. Once again, the Palestinian leadership is leading its people astray.

This article was originally published in the The Daily Beast on September 16, 2011.

Efraim Karsh is research professor of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King’s College London, director of the Middle East Forum (Philadelphia) and author, most recently, of Palestine Betrayed.

The Palestinians’ Imaginary State

by Steven J. Rosen

In a few weeks, an overwhelming majority in the United Nations General Assembly will likely vote for collective recognition of a Palestinian state. But which Palestinian state? Of the three Palestinian states the assembly could recognize, two are real and arguably could meet the requirements for statehood. But it is the third, purely imaginary one that the assembly will endorse, one that neither has a functioning government nor meets the requirements of international law.

According to the prevailing legal standard, the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, a “state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” Both the Hamas-controlled Palestinian entity in Gaza and the rival Fatah-governed Palestinian entity in the West Bank can be said to meet all four of these criteria of the law of statehood. The one on which the United Nations will vote does not.

In Gaza, Hamas controls a permanent population in a defined territory (i.e., Gaza within the armistice lines of 1949). Gaza has a functioning, if odious, government. And Hamas-controlled Gaza already conducts international relations with a large number of states. From a narrowly legal point of view, the Hamas Gaza entity could become a state, another miserable addition to a very imperfect world.

Of course, a Hamas state in Gaza is not something most of the world wants to see. A Hamas state allied to Iran would be a severe blow to international peace and security, and it would not be a state deserving of recognition by any democracy. It would be a state arising from the military coup of June 2007, a state that engages in large-scale violations of treaty obligations and human rights. Nor does Hamas seek statehood for Gaza alone. Hamas wants eventually to rule the whole of mandatory Palestine, comprising not just the West Bank along with Gaza, but all of today’s Israel too. Gaza alone is too small a prize for so grand an ambition. So this possible state is not on the table.

The Fatah Palestinian entity in the West Bank also could meet the legal requirements for statehood, and it would have more international support. It has a functioning government in the Palestinian Authority (PA), a permanent population, and international relations with a very large number of states. It also controls a defined territory, which comprises what are called areas A and B as defined under the Oslo II agreement of September 1995, plus additional territory subsequently transferred by Israel in agreed further redeployments. (Area A is the zone of full civil and security control by the Palestinian Authority, and Area B is a zone of Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control.) The Fatah West Bank entity within these lines also could be recognized as a state under international law.

But Fatah, the PA, and the broader PLO do not seek statehood for this West Bank entity that arguably could meet the legal requirements. Their minimum demand is a state that includes Gaza along with the West Bank, the eastern part of Jerusalem, and all the other parts of mandatory Palestine that were under Jordanian and Egyptian control before 1967. Fatah, the PA, and the PLO are demanding title to lands and authority over populations they do not control, being as they are under the rule of Hamas and Israel.

Unlike the two Palestinian entities that already exist, either of which could be recognized as a Palestinian state because they seem to fulfill the legal requirements, the Palestinian entity that a General Assembly majority will recognize as a state this September does not actually exist on Earth. It is imaginary and aspirational, not real. And it does not meet the legal requirements.

First, it will have two rival presidents pursuing incompatible policies. Mahmoud Abbas is presenting himself as the president of the Palestine that is pressing the claim in the U.N. General Assembly, but he is not considered to be the president anymore by Hamas, the largest political party in the putative state. And Hamas has Palestine’s own laws on its side in this dispute. Abbas was elected in 2005 to serve until January 2009, so his term has expired. In 2009, he unilaterally extended his term for another year until January 2010 (an extension that also has expired), but that extension did not adhere to Article 65 of the Palestinian constitution, the Basic Law. Hamas, which controls a majority in the now defunct Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), opposed the extension. According to Article 65 of the Basic Law, the legally empowered president of Palestine, since January 2009, has been PLC Speaker Abdel Aziz Dweik, a deputy representing Hamas. Palestine’s ruling party, Hamas, considers Dweik, not Abbas, to be the legal president of Palestine, and it has a strong case.

Second, the Palestine that the General Assembly will recognize also will have two rival prime ministers pursuing incompatible policies. Hamas denies that Abbas has the authority to appoint Salam Fayyad as prime minister, because Abbas is not legally the president of Palestine under Article 65 and because Fayyad has not been empowered as prime minister by the Palestinian Legislative Council as required by Article 66 of the Basic Law. Neither his first appointment, on June 15, 2007, nor his reappointment on May 19, 2009, was confirmed by the PLC as required. Hamas, which controls the majority in the PLC, considers the legal prime minister of the Palestinian Authority to continue to be Ismail Haniyeh, a senior political leader of Hamas. Haniyeh was empowered by the PLC to be prime minister of Palestine in February 2006. Abbas dismissed Haniyeh from the office on June 14, 2007, after the Gaza coup, but Haniyeh counters that this decree violated articles 45, 78, and 83 and that he continues to exercise prime ministerial authority under Article 83. The PLC also continues to recognize Haniyeh’s authority as prime minister. Here again, Hamas has the law on its side.

Third, this putative state of “Palestine” will also have a legislature that never meets. Elected on Jan. 25, 2006, for a term of four years, the PLC has enacted no laws, passed on no ministers, and conducted no meetings since 2007. Instead, Abbas says, “It is my right as a president to legislate laws and decisions that are called decrees. These decrees are legal, as long as the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) is not able to convene.”

It is common for Palestinian observers and their supporters in the West to attribute the PLC’s inaction to the fact that Israel arrested 21 of its more radical members in June 2006 after the abduction of Gilad Shalit, most of whom are still in detention. The Carter Center, for example, states, “With most of its representatives in Israeli prisons, the Palestinian Legislative Council never assembled the required quorum for meetings and hence was unable to carry out legislative functions designated to the PLC.” But the PLC has 132 members, of whom fewer than 20 are detained by Israel, and a quorum of the PLC requires only one more than half the members — 67 — to be present. So it is not Israel that is preventing a quorum.

In fact, neither faction contending to rule Palestine actually wants the PLC to meet, for different reasons. Hamas does not want it brought to session to enact new laws or amendments to existing laws when its majority has been diluted, especially because it fears unfavorable amendments to the election law. And Fatah is only too happy to see the Hamas members in jail, because it too does not want the PLC to meet, lest it enforce the Basic Law by replacing Abbas and Fayyad. PLC Speaker Dweik, whom Hamas considers to be the legally empowered president of Palestine, has said of his own arrest by Israel, “Any action that put an end to our activity in the parliament was welcomed by many, among them the Palestinian Authority.”

Fourth, this Palestine that the General Assembly will recognize will also lack the ability to hold presidential or legislative elections as required by Article 47 of its Basic Law — not because Israel will prevent them, but again because the rival Palestinian rulers will not allow them to happen. Abbas’s constitutionally defined term expired in January 2009, and the terms of the PLC representatives expired on Jan. 25, 2010, so new elections for both are overdue. The 2005 Palestinian Elections Law No. 9, Article 2, which Hamas recognizes as legally binding, and the replacement Elections Law unilaterally decreed by Abbas on Sept. 2, 2007, Articles 2 to 4, which Hamas considers an unlawful usurpation of power under the constitution, require elections by now, but no such elections are in sight. Neither of the rivals wants an election to be held under the electoral rules recognized as legally binding by the other, and neither will permit the other to compete freely on territories it controls as required by both sets of regulations.

So there you have it. The General Assembly will make a remarkable decision about all this in the next few weeks. Instead of recognizing either of the two state-like entities that already exist, each having many of the attributes of statehood required by international law, the General Assembly will create an imaginary state that has two incompatible presidents, two rival prime ministers, a constitution whose most central provisions are violated by both sides, no functioning legislature, no ability to hold elections, a population mostly not under its control, borders that would annex territory under the control of other powers, and no clear path to resolve any of these conflicts. It is a resolution that plants the seeds for civil and international wars, not one that advances peace.

Steven J. Rosen served for 23 years as a senior official of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. He is now the director of the Washington Project of the Middle East Forum

The Palestinian Fiddle

Ambassador (ret.) Yoram Ettinger, “Second Thought: a US-Israel Initiative”

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Palestinian issue is not a primary Middle East concern.

Pro-Western oil-producing Persian Gulf leaders are traumatized by the lethal Iranian nuclear threat, by a raging Arab Street of their own and by a potential Iraqi “earthquake” in the aftermath of the US evacuation. The pro-Western Hashemite regime is threatened by intensified discontent among its Bedouin power base; the Muslim Brotherhood hosted an anti-Western Arab
conference in Cairo on July 24-25, 2011; Strategically-critical Turkey is becoming more-Islamic and less-western; the pro-Western Moroccan monarchy is imperiled by the ripple effects of the Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian turmoil; Islamic terrorism is gaining ground; Russia, China and North Korea are expanding their penetration into the Middle East and the US posture of deterrence is eroding substantially.

However, while the Middle East is burning – irrespective of the Palestinian issue, of the Arab-Israeli conflict or Israel’s policies and existence – the American and the European foreign policy establishments are playing the Palestinian fiddle. Their track record features the support of Khomeini and the betrayal of the Shah, the embrace of Saddam as a constructive force, the crowning of Arafat as a messenger of peace, the hailing of Bashar Assad as a moderate leader, the legitimization of Qadaffi as a reformed ruler and the idolizing of Mubarak as an Egyptian Rock of Gibraltar. They are convinced that the Palestinian issue is a root cause of Middle East turbulence and the crown jewel of Arab policy-making. Therefore, they assume that the resolution of the Palestinian issue – by pressuring Israel to yield Judea and Samaria to the Palestinians – would moderate the Middle East, would subside anti-Western terrorism, would appease the Arabs, would enhance Western ties with Arab countries and would facilitate a Western-Arab coalition against Iran.

But, such foreign policy assumptions are invalidated by the real Middle East, which highlights the root causes of regional turbulence: inherent fragmentation, instability, unpredictability, volatility, violence, terrorism, hate education and tenuous policies, commitments and alliances. None of these 1,400 year old root causes is related to the less than 100 year old Palestinian issue.

Arab leaders have never considered the Palestinian issue their prime concern, but an intra-Arab tool and a pawn against Israel. They are aware of the subversive and treacherous history of the Arafat-Abu Mazen wing of the Palestinians, which was therefore expelled from Egypt in the late 1950s, from Syria in 1966, from Jordan in 1970, from Lebanon in 1982 and from Kuwait in 1991.

Thus, Arab leaders marshal their rhetoric, but not their resources, on behalf of Palestinians. For example, during the October 2010 Arab Summit in Libya, Arab leaders pledged $500MN to the Palestinian – only seven percent was ever delivered. More than $2 billion were pledged by the Arabs in support of the first and second Palestinian Intifada against Israel, but less than $500 million reached the Palestinians. During the 1980s, Arab financial support of the PLO was less than 10% of Arab financial support of the anti-Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan.

Arab regimes did not actively support the PLO during its 1982 war (in Lebanon) against Israeli and they did not flex a significant muscle on behalf of the Palestinians during the 2008 war in Gaza. In fact, this has been the Arab attitude toward the Palestinian issue since 1948, irrespective
of the identity of the Palestinian leader: Haj Amin al-Husseini, Shukeiri, Hammuda, Arafat, Abu Mazen or Haniyeh.

The Red Carpet, which welcomes Palestinian leaders in the West, is transformed into a shabby rug upon landing in Arab capitals. What do Arab regimes know about the Palestinian issue that Western policy makers do not know or understand?!

President Obama – No, He Can’t!

By Yoram Ettinger
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4082463,00.html, June 15, 2011

President Obama pressures Israel to adopt his initiative, which is based on the 1949 cease fire lines, including the repartitioning of Jerusalem and land swaps. He implies that Israeli rejection of his initiative would undermine US-Israel relations, while advancing Palestinian maneuvers at the UN.

However, Obama lacks the domestic backing to effectively pressure Israel, which has recently gained in bi-partisan support on Capitol Hill and among constituents, while Obama lost the “Bin Laden Bounce” and is struggling with a less-than-50% approval rating.

Obama’s power constraints are derivatives of the Federalist system, which is based on limited government with a complete separation of powers and checks and balances between Congress and the White House, Congressional “Power of the Purse” and the centrality of the constituent in a political system of bi-annual elections. Therefore, legislators are more loyal to – and fearful of – their constituents than to their party or to the president.  Moreover, the loyalty to constituents constitutes a prerequisite for re-election.

Obama’s constraints in pressuring the Jewish State emanate from the unique attitude of Americans – as early as the 1620 landing of the Mayflower, as well as the Founding Fathers – to the idea of reconstructing the Jewish Commonwealth in the Land of Israel.  The solid and sustained support enjoyed by Israel in the USA derives its vitality from the American people and from their representatives on Capitol Hill and in the legislatures of the 50 states more than from the president.  While the president plays a major role in shaping US-Israel relations, constituents and legislators laid the foundations for this relationship and they continuously codetermine its direction, tone and substance.  They can also initiate, suspend, terminate and amend policies, direct presidents and overhaul presidential policies.

The results of the November 2010 Congressional elections revealed that Obama’s policies had lost the support of most constituents.

According to a May 26, 2011 poll by CNN – which is usually critical of Israel – most Americans do not share Obama’s attitude towards Israel.  82% consider Israel an ally and a friend, compared with 72% in 2001.  67% support Israel, while only 16% support the Palestinians, compared with 60%:17% in 2009.  In fact, the Palestinians (16%) are as unpopular as are Iran (15%) and North Korea (17%).

These CNN findings exceed the February, 2011 Gallup poll (68% considered Israel an ally), the April 2011 Rasmussen Report (most Americans opposed foreign aid to Arab countries but supported foreign aid to Israel) and the April 2010 Quinnipiac Polling Institute (66% expected Obama to improve treatment of Israel).

But, the “Poll of Polls” is conducted daily in Congress – a coequal branch of government – where hard-core support of the Jewish State has been bi-partisan, robust and steady.  Majority Leader Senator Harry Reid and Minority Whip Congressman Steny Hoyer publicly criticized (fellow-Democrat) President Obama’s focus on the 1967 ceasefire lines. Other key Democrats – whose cooperation is critical to Obama’s reelection campaign – have clarified that they expect him to veto any anti-Israel UN resolution.  Just like their constituents – most Democrats value Israel as a unique ally, whose alliance with the US is based on shared values, mutual threats and joint interests.

Will Prime Minister Netanyahu leverage this unique American support, defying pressure and solidifying Israel’s posture of deterrence in the face of an unpredictably violent Middle East, where concessions breed radicalism, terrorism and war?  Or, will he succumb to the psychological warfare launched by the White House?

<em>Yoram Ettinger is former Israeli Ambassador to the United State and author of the Ettinger Report.</em>

The Middle East Is in Danger of Losing Its Christians

Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli, a senior Middle East Media Research Institute analyst, wrote about the terrible plight of christians in the Middle East. The focus of his article is how Christians are actually being treated by Muslim in Arab countries. Although not isolated to any one Muslim-Arab nation, many Iraqi Christian and their churches have suffered violaent attacks. They have been pressured to migrate to other countries. And, hundreds have been killed.

Jew and other non-Muslims are not the only ones criticizing the plight of Middle East Christians. Arab reporter are also reporting the defamation and persecution of Christians living in Arab-Muslim countries. The is an except from Dr. Raphaeli’s article.

Another Iraqi commentator, ‘Aziz Al-Hajj, argues that the experience of the Iraqi Christians is no different from that of other Christians in the Middle East, who all suffer blunt discrimination, aggression, abuse of rights, and pressure to emigrate. He points out that since 2003, over 50 churches have been burned or destroyed in Iraq; a cardinal was kidnapped, three priests were murdered, and about 800 Christians have been killed. The emigration of Christians is driven by their realization that if they stay behind, they will at best be second-class citizens. According to Al-Hajj, the number of Palestinian Christians is dwindling too: no more than 50,000 remain in the occupied territories, only 1000 of them in Gaza. Even in Bethlehem, the birthplace of Christ, the majority of the population is now Muslim.

If you still have any doubts about the intolerance of Muslims toward non-Muslims, you should read Dr. Raphaeli’s entire article. It is available on the MEMRI website.

Model Arab League at Miami U February 26…Education or Proselytizing?

Like the mock session of the Supreme Court, Congress, United Nations in which high school and college participate and compete, Model Arab League (MAL) gives youth a way to develop greater understanding of Middle East cultural, political, social, economic, and religious issues and processes of governance.

Some criticize the program as being a Saudi Arabian tool used to indoctrinate Americans into a one-sided view of Middle East conflicts, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of those critics is the Campus Watch, which has reported anti-Semitism among promoters of MAL.

If this program were under some other rubric for in-depth learning about Middle East culture and politics, this blogger would have little reason for skepticism about its underlying purpose. Along with the reported anti-Semitic bias, Saudi Arabian and other Middle Eastern leaders have discredited the Arab League of Nations as an organization of little influence and importance to the Middle East problems. If that were true, why then are they funding MAL? Why are they funding Middle Eastern academics at American Universities? Why are they funds mosques, businesses, and parochial schools as well?

One of the goals of Islam is the religious conversion of the world. The Arab League was and has always been an Islamic mirror of the United Nations (originally, League of Nations). Whereas the U.N. is secular and humanistic, the Arab League is Islamic with regard to both its legal and its ideological views. Consequently, the MAL should be view as more than a merely a unique educational learning method. As with the Model UN programs, it is also a means of indoctrinating people into a peaceful acceptance of the views, policies, and practices of the actual MAL, which is acceptance of the views of Islam and Shari’a governance.

One of the underlying tenets of both Islam and the Arab League is the elimination of infidels in general and the one national entity that represents a division to a united Arab Middle East; that entity is called Zion or the Jewish nation of Israel.

The issue is not the hypocrisy of western powers because the UK and US have broken promises to both the Arabs and the Israelis. The Israeli-Palestinian issue is one of ultimate control of all territories of the Middle East. Arabs do not necessarily intend to annihilate the Jews in the Middle East; they do however intend to rule over them if only as a subordinate state of the Arab League.

As in many European states, Ohio is among those being prepared for the universal glory of Islam: making all peoples submissive to Islam. One must admit that MAL is an ingenious way of evangelizing and proselytizing.

Welcome to the intended new world order.